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PROPOSITIONAL QUANTIFICATION
Ryan Christensen

Philosophy / Brigham Young U.
Provo, ut 84602, usa
ryan _christensen@byu.edu

Ramsey deWned truth in the following way: xz is true if and only if 'pzz(xz =
[zpz] & pz). This deWnition is ill-formed in standard Wrst-order logic, so it is
normally interpreted using substitutional or some kind of higher-order quantiWer. I argue that these quantiWers fail to provide an adequate reading of the
deWnition, but that, given certain adjustments, standard objectual quantiWcation
does provide an adequate reading.

1. w introduction

I

n his 1927 manuscript on truth, F.yP. Ramsey deWned truth like this:
A belief is true if it is a belief that p, and p.

He then expresses it “in Mr Russell’s symbolism” like this:
B is true : = : ('pz) . B is a belief that p z& p.

Df.z1

1
Ramsey 1991, pp. 9, 15n.7. Ramsey proposed the deWnition Wrst, but it was discussed
(independently, I believe) and rejected by Tarski 1930. It has been discussed recently by
Künne (2003, Chap. 6.2), where it forms the core of Künne’s “Modest Account” of truth;
by van Inwagen 2002, who tentatively rejects the deWnition on the grounds that the
quantiWcation cannot be made sense of; and by brieXy by Simmons 1999, who dismisses
it on the grounds that neither objectual nor substitutional quantiWcation work.
The deWnition, obviously, ignores Tarski’s argument that the semantic paradoxes
make it impossible to deWne truth for a formal language. The deWnition’s supporters may
believe that a solution to the paradoxes may be available for a deWnition of the property
of truth or of the concept of truth in natural language. In any case, I will ignore the
problem here.
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Ramsey’s deWnition has been debated recently in propositional form:
dt

xz is true iT 'pz (x = [zpz] z& pz).

May 14, 2011 (10:00 am)

This version diTers from Ramsey’s in that it is about the truth of propositions rather than beliefs. Ramsey didn’t want an ontology of propositions, but did want to preserve the categorizing feature of propositions,
which allows us to categorize beliefs (and other mental states) in terms
of their object. Most philosophers now are willing to discuss these propositions directly, because surely a belief is true or false because of the
proposition believed.
In making this move to propositions, Ramsey’s “B is a belief that pz”
has been replaced by “x = [zpz]”. These brackets might be read “the proposition that”, and apparently function in the deWnition to distinguish the
roles of the two occurrences of pz—to mark that in the Wrst case the p is
being used as a name of a proposition, instead of its content as it is in the
last clause. These brackets are not, however, standard logical operators.
A problem for dt, as for Ramsey’s deWnition, is the last clause. It is a
bare term. Ramsey defends it, saying that “we do not at Wrst realize that
“pz” is a variable sentencez and so should be regarded as containing a verb”
(p. 437). Indeed, Ramsey gives us two versions of the deWnition, one in
a greater, one in a lesser degree of formalization, but he doesn’t translate
it fully into English. He can’t: the deWnition is untranslatable, for English, apparently, has no way to express the content of an unknown propositional variable.
There are these two questions about the deWnition: what does the last
clause mean, and what do the brackets mean? Central to the answer to
these two questions is a third question, the question of the quantiWer:
how is the quantiWer to be understood?
We might understand it (1) in the standard way, as an objectual quantiWer, with its variable ranging over the names of objects; or we might
understand it (2) substitutionally, with its variable ranging over linguistic
expressions; or we might understand the variable (3) as ranging over content, and call the quantiWer “higher-order”, or “propositional”, or “sentential”, or “contentual”. Substitutional and contentual quantiWcation are
not without their controversies, but they appear to be necessary, at least
one of them, as standard objectual quantiWcation appears to be obviously
unsuited for the task. I will argue, however, that in this case at least the
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controversy is justiWed, as these two readings of the quantiWer are unsuited for the deWnition, but that with some modiWcations objectual
quantiWcation provides for the deWnition a satisfying and intuitive reading. These modiWcations are Russellian in nature. I would not be comfortable calling this an exposition of Russell, but my views are inspired
by his.
2. w substitutional quantification

Consider Wrst how substitutional quantiWcation answers the three questions.2 A substitutional quantiWer depends on the existence of a set of
expressions (called “substituends”), each of which may be substituted in
for the quantiWed variable. Normally the substitution class ranges over
some semantic class, such as nouns or predicates: the substitution instances for x might include, say, “is tall”, “is angry”, and so on; then
“'xz (Xanthippe xz)” is true if and only if Xanthippe is tall or angry.
DiTerent quantiWers may range over diTerent substitution classes, so
there might be one set of nouns and another set of predicates, each with
its own variables. But there is no reason that the substituends must be
restricted to a single semantic class, or even to any semantic class at all.
They may simply be strings of letters or punctuation marks; the interpretation has to do with the sentence that results when the variables are
replaced with one of the substituends. If, for example, “w is w” is a
permissible substituend for x, “'xz (snoxzhite)” is true, because “snow is
white” is a substitution instance of the sentence, and snow is white.
(Depending on what other expressions are in the substitution class, the
sentence may well be nonsense for most substituends.)
On the substitutional reading, the brackets in dt are an abbreviation
of “is the proposition that”. The right side of the deWnition is then “'pz (x
is the proposition that p, and pz)”. The substitution instances of pz include
every sentence, and so the instances of the right side of the deWnition will
include “x is the proposition that apricots ripen before peaches, and
apricots ripen before peaches”. (Even though the pz is, the xz need not be
a substitutional variable.) Given a substitutional reading, the deWnition
makes sense, the questions have been answered, and it appears that sub-
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2
Hofweber 2005 defends this reading of the quantiWer, and van Inwagen 2002 criticizes it.
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stitutional quantiWcation does an admirable job explaining the deWnition.
As a deWnition of truth, however, this reading of dt is incoherent.
Since we are taking propositions to be the primary bearers of truth and
related notions, we cannot take the units of logic to be, instead, orthographically individuated sentences, as would be necessary for substitutional quantiWcation. This motivational inconsistency gives rise to
concrete problems. Substitutional quantiWcation works best on a view of
sentences as strings of characters, but this approach seems to undercount
sentences in any language with ambiguity, homonymy, and other such
staples of natural language. Thus not every sentence is a separate substitution instance. And further, it seems that there is not a one-to-one
matchup between sentences and propositions. It seems, for example, that
“John kissed Mary” and “Mary was kissed by John” are diTerent sentences with diTerent linguistic features, but they express the same proposition, or at least they might. And conversely, “I’m hungry” is a single
sentence but expresses several diTerent propositions. This is part of the
motivation to deWne truth in terms of propositions instead. Hence the
deWnition doesn’t get the extension of truth right: there is a single instance “xz is the proposition that I’m hungry, and I’m hungry”, but there
is no single proposition that is expressed by the sentence “I’m hungry”,
so the deWnition fails to count every proposition.
I have not argued against substitutional quantiWcation altogether. But
even if it works in general, it is insuUcient as a reading of the quantiWer
in dt. Substituting sentences does a poor job of explaining truth for
propositions.
3. w contentual quantification

Another reading of the quantiWer involves some kind of higher-order
propositional quantiWcation.3 Obviously, we may quantify over propositions using standard Wrst-order quantiWcation. When we say “some propositions are true” we use ordinary quantiWcation limited to the domain
of propositions. But in dt we need to quantify over the contents of the
propositions. We need a kind of quantiWcation that ranges over the contents of contentful objects, not over the objects themselves. We need an
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3
Higher-order contentual quantiWcation has been attacked in van Inwagen 2002 and
defended in Grover 1992 and Künne 2003.
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intensional higher-order quantiWcation, which I prefer to call “contentual” quantiWcation, to contrast with objectual quantiWcation. If we have
this, the Wnal clause of dt is easy to read: it is simply the content of the
quantiWed proposition. The brackets also make sense as a kind of “demotion” operator, marking that the enclosed content is to be read as an
object. In English we have nominalization strategies that make properties
function grammatically as nouns. One reason we might do this is to
apply a property to a property. We attach “-ness” and “-hood” and “the
property of being”, and we form inWnitives and gerunds. We do the same
thing with propositions, attaching “that” or “the proposition that” or
removing the tense on the verb. With these devices, we convert sentences
into noun phrases, which can grammatically serve as subjects of predicates. This allows us to attribute truth to propositions—where “peaches
ripen after apricots is true” is nonsense, “the proposition that peaches
ripen after apricots is true” is not nonsense. We can introduce an operator into a formal language that serves a similar purpose, to convert a
sentence into a term. This is the purpose of the brackets in dt. The
brackets signal that the propositions function primarily as content, and
only secondarily as objects, and hence the appropriate quantiWcation is,
apparently, contentual.
But can we make sense of this kind of quantiWcation? What does it
mean to quantify over content? One way to make sense of the quantiWer
is to show it is a translation of a natural-language device that is unproblematic and well-understood. I’m thinking here of Peter van Inwagen’s
explanation of the standard objectual existential quantiWer—an example
of what he says is the only legitimate kind of deWnition (other than ostentation). He explained the quantiWer as a paraphrase of the English
locution “there is”, plus a strengthened system of pronouns. He takes this
to mean that the quantiWer is legitimate, and that it means “there is”.
Here we’re in a similar position, trying to explain a quantiWer. We want
to Wnd a locution in English that we understand, that is logically signiWcant, and that we can paraphrase with the contentual existential quantiWer.
If there is a locution in English that underlies our logical intuitions
that requires contentual quantiWcation, the quantiWcation will be explained. Some have argued that natural language makes use of “prosentences,” which (think of pronouns) are bits of language taking sentences
as antecedents. When we translate a sentence from English into logical
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notation, the pronouns turn into the variables: “There is something such
that itz is white” becomes “'xz (xz is white).” Prosentences should work in
the same way. In natural language they refer back to a sentence, and if we
could quantify over them (as we do pronouns) we have quantiWcation
over content. But there has been no consensus on whether there are prosentences in natural language. Grover suggests “it is true” as an Englishlanguage prosentence; Künne suggests “es verhält sich soz” as a Germanlanguage prosentence. He allows, with reservations, “things are thus” as
an English-language prosentence. (He doesn’t care much for Grover’s.)
Perhaps German has prosentences and English doesn’t.
No proposed prosentence has gained wide support. But even if we
accept that Grover and Künne are right and there are natural-language
locutions that can be read as prosentences, we have come only halfway.
Not every structure of English (or German) requires an expansion of
logical terminology. The English must be logically signiWcant. It would
suUce for the prosententialist to display some sentence of English that
uses prosentences and cannot be translated using the standard logical
devices. But this cannot be done. Any sentence that uses prosentences
can be translated with normal quantiWcation over objects and “is true”.
For example:
For any whether, either thether or not thether.
(Because I am unpersuaded by the proposed natural-language prosentences, I use Prior’s artiWcial ones [1971, p. 37]. You may replace these
with your favourite real ones, e.g., “For any way things might be said to
be, either things are that way or they are not.”) This may be translated,
using standard logical operators along with the truth predicate, like this:

;xz (Txz v ~Txz).
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The quantiWer is a standard objectual quantiWer with the domain restricted to propositions. Prosentences are supposed to explain truth, but
here we’ve used truth to explain prosentences. Which way does the correct analysis run?
For Grover’s proposed prosentence, “it is true”, it is apparently perverse to suggest that the correct linguistic explanation is not in terms of
truth. That is, that suggestion could be made only in the service of a very
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compelling philosophical theory. It may be the best we can do, but the
theory would have to have signiWcant beneWts to outweigh that cost. I’ll
just say that the jury is still out on whether prosententialism oTers beneWts signiWcant enough to be worthwhile.
This is not the only way to show that a proposed logical device is
legitimate, but it is the most common way for this device. It may well be
that contentual quantiWcation can be made to work, but there are serious
problems with it, just as there are with substitutional quantiWcation,
problems serious enough to make it worthwhile to try out objectual
quantiWcation again.
4. w objectual quantification

This is certainly the most familiar kind of quantiWcation. We know how
objectual quantiWcation works—the variables range over the names of
objects and occupy term position in the quantiWed sentence. But that
doesn’t seem to be what’s going on here. The quantiWer question is answered reassuringly, yes, but the other two questions are not reassuringly
answered. Question 1: what are the brackets doing? Brackets add nothing
to the name they surround; they mean nothing; they may be dropped
without loss. Question 2: what is the Wnal clause, that last pz ? Objectual
quantiWcation requires its variables to occupy term position, but that last
pz is not in term position. Hence the deWnition is ill formed—coming on
one side of a conjunction there must be a clause, but there is only a term.
In an attempt to preserve objectual quantiWcation, we could abandon
the rule that variables must occupy term position, and allow terms to be
atomic formulas (Hofweber 2005). What would a formula mean that
consists only of a single term? The interpretation of the language would
specify some predicate P as understood as being applied to every bare
term; so tz by itself would be understood as meaning “tz is Pz ”. If P is
“red”, then “tz is tall z& ty” would be interpreted as “tz is tall and tz is red”.
Does this method make sense of dt? Well, on this reading the brackets
are still redundant and meaningless, and may be dispensed with. Hence
the identity clause adds nothing to the sense:
dt*

May 14, 2011 (10:00 am)

is equivalent to
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dt**

xz is true iT x.

And this, since a bare xz is taken to mean “xz is true”, is trivially true
under the intended interpretation. While it would be perverse to deny
that xz is true if and only if xz is true, this can scarcely be called a theory
of anything, even truth. So again it seems that objectual quantiWcation
will not work in this deWnition.
It is these failures that make substitutional or contentual quantiWcation attractive, and make objectual quantiWcation immediately dismissed. But objectual quantiWcation can be made to work. The secret lies
in the brackets. Under the contentual reading of the quantiWers, the brackets serve as a demotion operator, converting a content into an object.
To make objectual quantiWcation viable for dt, it may be necessary to
Wnd a way to reverse the brackets, to make them serve as a “promotion”
operator that converts objects into content—or it may be necessary to
Wnd a way to remove them altogether. With objectual quantiWcation, the
brackets are meaningless surrounding the Wrst p, but with a promotion
operator on the second p, the deWnition might make sense.
A mathematician might express the T zschema for the sentences of
arithmetic using Gödel coding:
Ty([fz]) ø f,
where “[fz]” is the Gödel number of the sentence f. But this could be
put a diTerent way:
Ty(nz) ø {nz},
where “{nz}” is the sentence coded with number n. Just as “[ ]” is a device
that “demotes” a sentence to a term, “{ }” is a device that “promotes” a
term to a sentence. The device is deWned for a subset of the numbers. For
each number in that class there is a corresponding sentence f. A promoted number nz functions semantically as the sentence f. The second
T schema above can be quantiWed using regular Wrst-order objectual
quantiWcation over (a subset ofy) numbers, without worries of quantifying into quotation marks:

May 14, 2011 (10:00 am)

;nz (Ty(nz) ø {nz}).
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Similarly with propositions—contentual quantiWcation may be a red
herring. Given that propositions exist, there is no problem with objectual
quantiWcation with the domain restricted to propositions. So instead of
using the brackets as a demotion, or nominalizing, operator, we should
make use of a promotion, or denominalizing, operator that can take an
object and express its content. Here we may use curly brackets: if pz is a
proposition, {ypy} is its content. The curly brackets are deWned for a
subclass of the objects in the domain, and for each object in that class the
interpretation assigns a sentence. A bracketed object functions semantically as the associated sentence. Given this, we may restate the deWnition
of truth:
dt2

xz is true iT 'pz (x = p z& {ypy}).

May 14, 2011 (10:00 am)

Here the quantiWcation is standard Wrst-order objectual quantiWcation
(with a domain restriction), and with this explanation of the brackets, the
Wnal clause is unproblematic. The three diUculties with the deWnition
have been dealt with adequately.
It may be objected that the denominalizing brackets are syntactically
identical with the truth predicate. What I have called “promotion” is
(roughly) what Quine called “semantic ascent”. But these brackets diTer
from the truth predicate in at least two ways. First, they are semantically
diTerent. When applied to the name of a proposition, Ty(Tarski’s favourite proposition) means “Tarski’s favourite proposition is true”; {Tarski’s favourite proposition} means “snow is white”. Even according to
redundancy or prosentential theories of truth, “Tarski’s favourite
proposition is true” is not semantically identical with “snow is white”.
Second, the brackets are more basic than truth in that truth may be
deWned in terms of the brackets (as in dt2), but the brackets cannot be
deWned in terms of truth.
It may also be objected that we can’t understand sentences containing
these brackets. This is surely true in general. I don’t know what “{Alice’s
last words} and {Bob’s favourite conjecture}” means. It may mean “apricots ripen before peaches and there are inWnitely many twin primes”; it
may mean something else. But even though I don’t know what it means,
it still has a meaning. Just as “Wve times the number of planets in the
Milky Way” denotes some number, even if I don’t know what it is, so
sentences with the denominalizing brackets have a meaning, even if I
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don’t know what it is. In some cases, I may know the meaning of a sentence containing brackets. For example, I know what “{Fermat’s Last
Theorem} v 2 + 2 = 4” means. If I know what proposition is named, I
can understand the sentence; but the usefulness of the brackets is that I
can quantify over the content of propositions I don’t understand.
One more step: if this device is legitimate, it is unnecessary. The
brackets never disambiguate, and so are not needed. If a term in the class
is attached to a property, it functions as an object; when it is not, it functions as the corresponding content. This gives us
dt3

xy is true iT 'pz (x = p z& pz).

The quantiWcation is unexceptional, the brackets are gone, and the Wnal
clause means just what it ought to. dt3 may provide a compelling reading, since it may be that propositional quantiWcation does not fall neatly
into the objectual/contentual distinction. If propositions are structured,
dt3 might easily be translated into the structural form, with a single
proposition occurring twice within the deWnition, in two diTerent locations corresponding to its two diTerent roles. There is no metaphysical
correlate of the brackets. Without such a correlate, the distinction between objectual quantiWcation with the domain restricted to propositions
and contentual quantiWcation begins to disappear. If propositions are
structured, one location in the structure might take objects and another
take contents; the same proposition appears twice, once as an object and
once as a content.
dt3 is reminiscent of the propositional quantiWcation that occurs in
the expository sections of Principia Mathematicaz. In Chapter ii of the
Introduction, Russell quantiWes over propositions in the course of an
argument that propositions do not, strictly speaking, exist (1: 41–2). Here
the quantiWcation is into term position: “(pz) . pz is false.” In Part 1, section b, there is again quantiWcation over propositions, but this time over
the content of the propositions:

| . (zpz) . pz v ~ypz.

(PM 1: 129)
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In neither case is there any indication that there is anything unusual
about this kind of quantiWcation. This may be explained, in part, by the
fact that these sections are not part of the formal system and that,
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oUcially, propositions don’t exist.
It may also be explained, in part, by the familiar charge of Russell’s
sloppiness about (or confusion ofy) use and mention. And this charge
may very well be true. If we are unclear about the nature of propositions
—zwhether, for examples, propositions are linguistic objects or conceptual objectsz—zthis kind of confusion is natural.4
But I think that if we understand propositions correctly, this confusion is not only natural, but correct. The use/mention distinction is a
distinction of linguistic objects. You cannot really use a proposition as
you can use a word. We might loosely speak that way if we want, because
we can make a related distinction. But making that distinction is not
necessary for propositions.
So we can make sense of dt using standard Wrst-order quantiWcation.
The cost of this is a little extra logical machinery—certainly dt3 doesn’t
look right—but in the case of propositions I think this is just as it should
be. The duality of propositions makes them tempting as the foundation
for a theory of truth. Propositions are objects, and propositions are also
contents. Because they are objects, they can bear properties, such as
truth. Because they are contents, they are transparent onto the world.
This is to say that propositions are their own truth conditions: under
what conditions is it true that apricots ripen before peaches? Precisely if
and only if apricots ripen before peaches. Propositions appear to bridge
the gap between the mind and the world.
I am not sure that Ramsey’s deWnition will, in the end, explain truth
in the way it ought to. But I see no grounds for doubt because of problems with quantiWcation.
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In The Principles of Mathematicsz, Russell tried without success to distinguish
between propositions as asserted and propositions as not asserted. Part of this distinction
is that between propositions as contents and propositions as objects. Russell’s attempted
distinction goes beyond this, however, in that he claims that only true propositions can
be asserted.
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